Introduction
It is a common feature of the modern mass production economy that contracts for the manufacturing, distribution and delivery of products and services are governed by the standard terms and conditions of one of the parties.
1 It is usually the standard contract of the party who is in a stronger bargaining position that will govern the situation. 2 One of the perennial problems in respect of standard terms in most legal systems is whether the terms which are usually not the object of specific bargaining has been included in the agreement between the parties or not. 3 It is unsurprisingly also a problem which has been encountered in the interpretation and application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna 1980 (CISG) . 4 The CISG is generally recognised as one of the most successful instruments for the harmonisation and unification of international trade law. It has been adopted in 76 countries worldwide, representing about 80% of world trade. 5 It therefore potentially applies to a very great number of international transactions. One of the main problems of legal unification instruments, irrespective of how successful they are, is that the apparent unification achieved by uniform law, is endangered by divergent interpretations and application in the various jurisdictions where the uniform law  Sieg Eiselen B Juris, LL B, LL D; Professor in Private Law, University of South Africa; member of the Johannesburg Bar. eiselgts@unisa.ac.za applies. 6 Although it is also fairly generally recognised that the uniformity of the CISG has been preserved in its interpretation and application, 7 there are a few areas where court's have interpreted and applied the convention in divergent manners. 8 The inclusion of standard terms is one such area.
Where the incorporation of standard terms have been expressly agreed upon by the parties no problem arises, but quite often the incorporation of the standard terms takes place by a mere reference in an oral communication or written communication to the inclusion of such terms. Sometimes the text of the standard terms will accompany the main agreement, for instance being printed on the back of an order form, but quite often the contract merely contains an incorporation clause without any accompanying text. The question then arises whether there has been a valid incorporation or not.
The CISG does not expressly deal with requirements for the inclusion of standard terms and court's must therefore rely on the interpretation of the articles dealing with the formation of the contract in general, 9 as well as the provisions of article 7.
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Based on an interpretation of these articles and the general principles underlying the CISG, court's have developed three distinct but divergent approaches:
 a strict approach which has been developed mainly in the German court's which requires that the standard terms be made available to the other party at the time of contracting; 11  a lenient approach which allows the standard terms to be included even after the conclusion of the contract.
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The object of this article is firstly to critically examine the different approaches found in the case law against the back-drop of the provisions of the CISG in order to establish the most appropriate approach to the inclusion of standard terms under the CISG. The solution to this problem is of practical importance for international traders who make use of standard terms in their everyday dealings.
Basic principles of the CISG
The CISG deals with the formation of the contract in Part II, and more specifically for our purposes in articles 14, 18, 19 and 23. 14 However, it is also necessary to consider article 8 which deals with the interpretation of any statements made by the parties, as the statements and conduct of the parties form the basis for the offer and acceptance. 15 Although some earlier decisions held that whether standard terms have been validly incorporated or not fell outside the scope of the CISG in terms of article 4, it is now generally accepted that the issue falls squarely within the ambit of the Convention and need to be decided according to its provisions and not the provisions of the applicable domestic contract law. 16 The statements and conduct of the parties leading up to and including the conclusion of the contract must be interpreted in the light of article 8. Article 8 therefore must also be applied to the interpretation of the offer made by the offeror in terms of article 14 and the acceptance of the offer by the offeree in terms of articles 18 and 19 as the statements and conduct of the parties underlie the offer and the acceptance.
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Also relevant is article 23 which deals with the time that the contract is deemed to have come into existence.
The CISG uses the usual approach found in most legal systems to the analysis of the conclusion of the contract, namely distinguishing between an offer and an acceptance bringing the contract into existence. Article 14 states:
(1) A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and the price.
Article 14 states the minimum requirements for a valid offer, namely identification of the goods and a definite price and made with the intention of being bound if the other party accepts that offer. As is clear from this article there is no provision dealing specifically with the incorporation of standard terms. Article 18 deals with the requirements for an acceptance:
(1) A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer is an acceptance. Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance.
(2) An acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror.
The offer can be accepted by a statement, ie orally or in writing, or by any other conduct which unequivocally indicates the fact that the offeree wants to accept the offer and that it will be bound by the contract. 19 The acceptance may not contain any In the circumstances where the written offer contains a clear incorporation clause and is accepted without any further statement or qualification by the offeree, it would be objectively reasonable conduct on the part of the offeror to rely on such unqualified acceptance and to accept that its standard terms will apply. It is the same deduction that a reasonable person of the same kind as the offeror would make in similar circumstances.
These general statements must be qualified in regard to the substantive validity of the standard terms being incorporated. Although the issue on the substantive validity of standard terms is generally regarded as an issue that falls outside the scope of the CISG, this does not hold true in the case of standard terms that are unusual or surprising. 25 In the case of clauses that are unusual or surprising, it cannot be said that the other party could reasonably have expected to find such clauses in the standard terms and a party should therefore not be held bound to such clauses.
What qualifies as an unusual or surprising term will depend on the particular circumstances of the parties, the type of trade involved and the dispositive law displaced. 26 Terms that are generally encountered in standard terms in a particular trade cannot qualify as unusual or surprising, even if they are very harsh or onesided. Surprising or unusual terms can be said to fall outside the consensus or the agreement of the parties, having regard to the principles underlying articles 14, 18 and 8. 27 One could further argue that good faith in terms of article 7 also requires a party to make the other party specifically aware of any unusual or surprising clauses. (1) No term contained in standard terms which is of such a character that the other party could not reasonably have expected it, is effective unless it has been expressly accepted by that party.
(2) In determining whether a term is of such a character regard shall be had to its content, language and presentation.
The Commentary to article 2.1.20 goes on to state that a party who accepts the other party's standard terms will be bound to those terms "irrespective of whether or not it actually knows their content in detail or fully understands their implications".
However, a party will not be bound to terms that can be qualified as surprising terms as defined in article 2.1.20. This provision reflects the principle of good faith and fair dealing required by article 1.7 of the Principles.
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The relevant case law will now be analysed against the background of the general provisions as set out above.
Analysis of the case law
The problems in regard to the incorporation of standard terms manifest in four  where the standard terms are set out in a language that is different from the language of the contract or the negotiations between the parties; 33 and  where the standard terms are added after the actual conclusion of the contract, for instance in a confirmation letter or printed on the products. 
Incorporation clause without the provision of the standard terms
There are a number of cases, mainly of German origin, where it has been held that standard terms will not be regarded as having been validly incorporated into the contract unless the offeror has provided the offeree with a copy of the standard terms. This represents the very strict approach to the incorporation of standard clauses. The leading case is the German Machinery case 35 where the Bundesgerichtshof held as follows:
2. Thus, through an interpretation according to Art. 8 CISG, it must be determined whether the general terms and conditions are part of the offer, which can already follow from the negotiations between the parties, the existing practices between the parties, or international customs (Art. 8(3) CISG). it would be a wrong and unfair risk allocation --even in commercial transactions --if a mere reference would suffice and if the other party had an obligation to search the contents of the standard terms before the conclusion of the contract at the peril that they become binding.
Although it could be said that it is desirable that a party should make the standard terms available at the time of the contracting, it goes beyond the clear rules contained in articles 8, 14 and 18 and their underlying principles to require contractual conduct which is not even required in domestic law, especially as these contracts are commercial and not consumer contracts. Proponents of this approach also rely on the principle of good faith contained in article 7 to argue that good faith requires a party to make its standard terms available. 41 However, good faith also requires a party not to create false impressions about its own intentions as embodied in article 8(2). This would entail that the other party should not create an impression that it has accepted the inclusion of the standard terms where there is clear reference to their inclusion.
At least in the common law world, the principle of caveat subscriptor is widely accepted and applied. Especially in commercial transactions English law attaches great importance to the signing of a document. The general rule derived from Parker
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The fact that this view is the generally accepted view under German scholars, as maintained by Magnus "Standard Contract Terms" 320 and the German Supreme Court, is by no means an indication that the issue is not controversial.
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Magnus "Standard Contract Terms" 320. clause, it will be held bound to the standard terms incorporated whether it has read the standard terms or not and whether they were available to it at the time or not. A reasonable common law trader in the position of the offeror would be most surprised if told that the mere incorporation clause as accepted would be insufficient to make its standard terms applicable. It would seem that a German trader would be equally surprised, given the provisions of the domestic German law. One cannot therefore agree with the basic assumption made by the court here.
It would seem that the real reason for the stricter standard set by the Bundesgerichtshof is based on the assumption that there exists a big difference between domestic sales where it is easy to obtain reasonable access to standard terms from the other party by merely requesting them, and international sales where it is allegedly not so easy and therefore not reasonable.
The court goes on to state that under the principle of good faith there is no duty on the offeree to make inquiries about the standard terms. This is an astonishing statement in the light of the impression that the statement or conduct of the offeree must make on the offeror by accepting the reference to the standard terms without question, query or protest. Indeed, one would expect the principle of good faith to prompt the offeree to make enquiry about the standard terms or protest their inclusion at the time of contracting. In the era of modern communications including cellphones, fax and the internet, it is no more difficult for a participant in international trade to make enquiry about or require a copy of the standard terms than it is for participants in domestic transactions. The CISG does not contain specific requirements for the incorporation of standard business conditions, such as the [sellers'] general conditions of sale, into a contract. Therefore, the necessary requirements for such an inclusion are to be developed from Art. 14 et seq. CISG, which contain the exclusive requirements for the conclusion of a contract (cf. Piltz, Internationales Kaufrecht, Art. 5 n. 75). Consequently, the general conditions of sale have to be part of the offer according to the offeror's intent, where the offeree could not have been unaware of that intent, in order to become a part of the contract (Art. 8(1) and (2) CISG). This inclusion into the offer can also be done implicitly or can be inferred from the negotiations between the parties or a practice which has developed between them.
The approach taken by the Austrian court is a commercially more realistic approach and in line with the general requirements of the CISG. This more moderate approach is to be preferred above that of the German Supreme Court.
Contract terms on the back but no clear reference on the front
The facts in the French Isea case 45 present a more problematic scenario. In that case the buyer sent order forms to the seller. The order forms contained standard terms printed on the back, but contained no incorporation clause on the front of the document. The court held as follows:
The disputed sale was formed, by application of Article 18 (2) There is no indication or analysis by the court whether the writing on the back of the order form was conspicuous or not or whether a reasonable person in the position of the seller would have noticed such terms on the back of this document. The court, taking a strict approach, simply decides that the lack of an incorporation clause on the front part of the document was enough to deny the standard terms on the reverse side any legal relevance.
Once again this is in a commercial sense a rather startling conclusion without properly analysing the appearance of the document. The use of standard terms in all sales, domestic and international is a well known and widespread phenomenon.
Indeed, in this case both parties regularly made use of standard terms. The buyer's terms were printed on the back of the order form, the seller consistently sent his standard terms to the buyer, albeit after the conclusion of the contract. One may well ask whether the conduct of the seller in this case who probably would have seen the writing on the back of the document, acted in good faith by studiously ignoring the writing on a document which was clearly a contractual document and in which a reasonable commercial party would have expected to find standard terms. It is submitted that in this case the French court displayed too strict an approach to the incorporation of standard terms.
Where the standard terms are in a different language
In international transactions the contracting parties very often conclude their agreement in a neutral language such as English, or in the language of one of the contracting parties. In these cases it quite often happens that the agreement refers to the incorporation of the standard terms of either the buyer or seller and that those standard terms then exist only in a different language. The issue is whether the incorporation in these circumstances should be regarded as effective. On the one hand one may argue that where there is a clear incorporation term, the party should be bound by the terms incorporated unless it objects to such incorporation. The fact that the terms are in another language theoretically makes it difficult for that party to take subjective notice of the contents of such terms, but practically speaking it is well known that such terms are very often not read by the other party. The failure of the latter to object to the inclusion should have the same effect as if the terms had been in the same language as the rest of the contract.
Magnus however takes a different view. He states:
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Generally, only if formulated in the language of the contract is the necessary reference to standard terms effective. The language of the contract is the language in which the parties negotiated and concluded the contract. However, if the reference is made in a language which the addressee (or its representative) in fact understands this constitutes a valid reference. A reference in another language has, however, no effect.
In principle, the same considerations apply to the language of the standard terms themselves. But if in a longstanding commercial relationship a party has always accepted standard terms in a language which is neither the contract language nor understood by this party then such conduct and the principle of good faith disallows this party to object to the terms. standard terms, the language in which they are couched becomes wholly immaterial.
Magnus' point of view is supported by the decision in the German
Whether it is in a language that the addressee understands or not, makes no practical difference -the addressee has taken no interest in obtaining the standard terms and has also not objected to their inclusion. The addressee has therefore created the objective impression that it has assented to the inclusion of the standard terms and the other party should be able to rely on that impression if regard is had to the principles laid down in article 8. 48 The reasoning of the court in the German
Clothes case 49 is to be preferred:
The [Seller] may not invoke comprehension difficulties, which were not even recited correctly and are hardly understandable in view of the letter of 10 June 1994, which was written in German. A party that accepts a foreign language for negotiations or accepts foreign language offers has to let the intricacies of meaning of the foreign language be held against them because, in case of doubt, the offeree is held to make objections to get sufficient certainty, to make further inquiries or use a professional translation (v. Caemmerer-Schlechtriem, aa. Art. 8, para. 4a). Should it neglect to do so, any unwanted consequences are to be borne by it pursuant to CISG Art. 8(1).
In the American MCC-Marble Ceramic case, 50 the court also dealt with language risks, quite correctly placing the risk on the party accepting a communication in a foreign language without any further inquiry:
We find it nothing short of astounding that an individual, purportedly experienced in commercial matters, would sign a contract in a foreign language and expect not to be bound simply because he could not comprehend its terms. We find nothing in the CISG that might counsel this type of reckless behavior and nothing that signals any retreat from the proposition that parties who sign contracts will be bound by them regardless of whether they have read them or understood them.
The approach taken in the German Knitware case and expounded by Magnus again evidences an approach that is too strict and not in step with commercial realities or with the basic principles of the CISG and should therefore be rejected. 
Where the standard terms are added ex post facto
In stark contrast to these cases where the court's have followed an approach that is far too strict in regard to the incorporation of standard terms, there is one case where a court has followed an approach which is unacceptably lax. In the American Berry case the court held as follows:
51 Finally, the exclusionary clause was printed in bright red on top of all 63 boxes of raspberry planting stock, and there is no dispute that Plaintiff Berry received and opened these boxes. Even if this were the only notice of the exclusionary clause, similar to the case in Mortenson, the clause is conscionable and enforceable.
Even if the CISG did apply, the exclusionary clause is still enforceable because Plaintiff paid the price for the goods and opened the package where the exclusionary clause was prominently displayed on top in red. (Article 18(3):
"assent by performing an act, such as one relating to the dispatch of the goods or payment of the price ..."; Article 18(1): an additional term can be accepted by "conduct by the offeree indicating assent.") Also, under Article 9(2), "the parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned." It appears that the placement of oral orders for goods followed by invoices with sales terms is commonplace, and while every term of the contract is not usually part of the oral discussion, subsequent written confirmation containing additional terms are binding unless timely objected to. See, e.g., W.T. why the nursery could not refer the buyer to the inclusion of its standard terms at the time of contracting.
Conclusion
It is regrettable that at present there does not seem to be any harmony in the interpretation and application of the CISG in regard to the inclusion of standard At the other end of the scale, the lax approach applied by an American court in the Berry case 59 should equally be rejected. Allowing standard terms to be included ex post facto without allowing for a modification of the contract is totally unacceptable.
The fact that the standard terms to be incorporated into a contract is couched in a language different to that of the contract, should not affect the validity of their incorporation unless the other party has objected to their inclusion at the time of the contract.
It is submitted that the moderate approach used by the Austrian Supreme Court 60 is based on a proper interpretation of the CISG and is also more closely aligned to commercial practice and the expectations of international traders. It is hoped that this approach will eventually find favour with the majority of court's and represent the harmonised approach that should emerge.
The only exception to these rules should be in respect of those provisions which can be assessed as surprising or unusual in the particular circumstances. A party should not be held bound to such clauses unless it has been specifically made aware of such terms. 
SUMMARY
The problem dealing with the inclusion of standard terms and conditions in contracts is a problem that has engaged most legal systems. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna 1980 (CISG) does not expressly deal with this problem. Accordingly the solution to the issue must be found in an interpretation and application of the general principles found in articles 8, 14
and 18. One of the main objects of the CISG is the harmonisation of international trade law. It is generally recognised that in order to achieve harmonisation it is necessary that courts should interpret and apply the convention in a consistent and harmonious manner. Unfortunately a number of approaches have emerged from courts around the world in regard to the inclusion of standard terms. German courts have developed a strict approach which requires that the standard terms be made available to the addressee at the time of the conclusion of the contract. They also require that the standard terms be couched in the language of the main contract. In stark contrast an American court has used an approach which is very lax in regard to incorporation, even allowing incorporation after the conclusion of the contract. There is, however a more moderate approach set out in decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court where the court adopted an approach which is more akin to that found in most legal systems, namely that a clear incorporation clause in the contract is sufficient for the effective incorporation of standard terms. The author critically examines the case law, the various approaches and the underlying arguments on which they are based, before reaching the conclusion that the two extreme approaches should be rejected in favour of the more moderate approach. This approach is founded on a proper interpretation of the provisions of the CISG as well as being in step with international trade practice. 
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